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Let's Make Lawyers Happy: Advocating
Mandatory Pro Bono
DONALD PATRICK HARRIS*

INTRODUCTION

According to the American Bar Association ("ABA ") Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct and the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, an ideal of the legal profession is that all lawyers work to improve the law,
the legal system and the legal profession by providing professional services
to persons of limited means.' Whether this ideal should be a mandatory
obligation has generated a tremendously fierce debate within the legal

community.

Proponents of mandatory pro bono argue that lawyers have an obligation
to provide free services because, among other things, the practice of law is a
profession.2 Proponents further argue that mandatory pro bono is justified
because lawyers enjoy a "monopoly" of the legal system, and with that

monopoly comes an obligation to provide public service.3 Additionally, they
argue there is a strong tradition of providing public service suggesting
continued commitment to pro bono service and an attorney has a moral
obligation to see that those already handicapped do not suffer the cumulative
disadvantage of being without proper legal representation." Opponents of
mandatory pro bono argue it is unconstitutional, there will be problems in
*
B.S., California State University, Northridge; J.D., Loyola of Los Angeles Law
School. I would like to thank Professor Gary Williams for his unwavering support, guidance
and encouragement.

1. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

ETHicAL CONSIDERATION

(1986 ed.) ("EC") 2-16 states: "Persons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should
be able to obtain necessary legal services, and lawyers should support and participate in ethical
activities designed to achieve that objective." (footnotes omitted) EC 2-25 provides: "'he basic
responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the
individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one
of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer.... The rendition of free legal services
to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer ....
See
also ABA MODELRULEs OFPROFESSIONALCONDUCT, Rule 6.1 (1993 ed.) ("A lawyer should
aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services a year.").
2. A profession by definition requires some spirit of public service. See Section I C,
infra.
3. See Section I D, infra.
4. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility:Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
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administering a mandatory program, and the profession of law is no different
from other professions which do not require public service.'
Getting past the rhetoric, the arguments come down to the following:
proponents of mandatory pro bono contend lawyers have an obligation to
serve the public and the legal system while opponents emphasize a lawyer's
right to choose to "succeed" by maximizing her income if she so chooses.
Is there an inevitable conflict between a lawyer's desire to succeed and
a lawyer's responsibility or obligation to serve the public and the legal
system?6 There are obvious extremes to each concept. An attorney, on the
one hand, could focus exclusively on maximizing her income. An attorney,
however, could also completely sacrifice her livelihood. This article hopes to
make clear that there should be no conflict between the potential for a legal
career to provide a livelihood and the potential to provide a meaningful life
using legal skills as an expression of our connection to fellow humans.
The debate over mandatory pro bono has been generated by the legal
profession's generally accepted definition of success, which is measured
solely by financial success. This paper proposes that the legal profession
should redefine success to include service to others. The new definition will
eschew economic success as the exclusive standard. Instead, the new
definition will allow attorneys to focus on helping others, and will ensure a
sound legal system to which all persons have access. The new definition will
also incorporate a high standard of morality and confer a benefit on lawyers,
indigent clients, and society. Most importantly, one of the "highest goals of
society," achieving and maintaining equality before the law, will be reached
if lawyers adopt this new definition.
Section I of this paper summarizes the debate over mandatory pro bono.
Section 11 describes the increasing unhappiness of attorneys nationwide and
explores various reasons for this discontent. Section II also discusses why
lawyers should redefine success by demonstrating that the revised definition
of success will quell much of the mandatory pro bono debate and help lawyers
become more satisfied and happier. Section III demonstrates the wisdom of
redefining success and makes clear that the ABA should consider revising the

5. See Section I, infra.
6. The reference to "public" acknowledges that many indigent persons are forced to
face their problems alone, without legal assistance. The "legal system" reference is included
because we condemn the system to one-sided justice if only those who can afford to hire quality
lawyers have their legal interest represented, while the less affluent and the less fortunate are
denied access to high quality legal representation. In effect, the adversarial process that is the
touchstone of our legal system will fail. This author's opinion is that serving both interests is
desirable and beneficial, in the long run, to the lawyer. Thus, no attempt will be made to
differentiate these two interests.
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rules concerning pro bono service to make such service mandatory. This part
of the paper will use the career of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall as the
paradigm for an attorney who practiced the preferred definition of success.
Justice Marshall's career makes it evident that the legal profession should

include public service in its definition of success. Overall, lawyers will be
happier, more productive, and society will be better served if they use Justice
Marshall's definition of success.

I. THE GREAT DEBATE
"One of the most important ideals of the legal profession is that all
persons and groups should be able to receive competent representation in the
legal process."7 Nevertheless, according to a 1987 pilot survey eighty percent
of poor people's civil legal needs go unmet.' Indeed, society has made its
most vulnerable citizens deal with increasingly complex government
bureaucracies, and a confusing legal system, making it difficult for them to
obtain basic rights and necessities such as food and shelter.9 In short, the poor
are unable to enforce their rights or obtain basic essentials because of the lack

of effective assistance of counsel.
Against this backdrop, a debate about the concept of mandatory pro bono

has confronted the legal profession.' ° The question posed by the mandatory
7. Thurgood Marshall, Financing Public Interest Law Practice: The Role of the
Organized Bar, 61 A.B.A. J. 1487, 1487 (Dec. 1975). Accord ABA MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY EC 2-16, EC 2-25 (1986 ed.). See also ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 cmt. (1996 ed.).
8. Cameron Barr, Doers and Talkers, THE AM. L., July-Aug. 1990, at 51. See also
Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 86 n.22 (1990) (citing CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, NORTH
DAKOTA SUPREME COURT, NORTH DAKOTA TRIAL LAWYERS' ASS'N, A WORKABLE PLAN FOR
CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: A PRACTICAL, EQUITABLE AND POLIICAL PROPOSAL FOR
BAR LEADERSHIP (1988); COMMrTTEE TO IMPROVE THE AvAILABILrTY OF LEGAL SERVICES,
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1989); SPANGEBERG
GROUP REPORT, INTWo NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENTS OF THE UNMET
LEGAL NEEDS OFTHE POOR AND OFTHE PUBLIC GENERALLY (1989).
9. Id.It is noteworthy that we are behind Europe in efforts to aid the less fortunate
of the respective countries. Talbot D'Alemberte, The Role of the Courts in Providing Legal
Services: A Proposalto Provide Legal Access for the Poor,17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 181
(1989).
10. The term pro bono originates from pro bono publico which means "for the good of
the state" or for the welfare of the whole. Honorable Joseph W. Bellacosa, Symposiun on
Mandatory Pro Bono: ObligatoryPro Bono PublicoLegal Services: Mandatory or Voluntary?
Distinction Without a Difference?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 747 (1991). As used throughout
this article, pro bono will refer to the diffuse efforts aimed at providing legal resources for the
unrepresented or under-represented. It will not, however, refer to the vast bulk of what lawyers
now call pro bono work. According to a comprehensive survey of lawyers' pro bono activity,
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pro bono debate is this: should lawyers be required to donate a reasonable

amount of their time to represent indigent defendants, contribute through
community involvement, and participate in charitable work?"

The view throughout this article is that pro bono activities should be an
integral part of lawyers' ordinary activities. This is a critical principle. If pro
bono work is considered an act of charity, then every pro bono activity will be

voluntary and based on the pure discretion of the individual lawyer. If,
however, pro bono work is seen as a professional duty, it is more likely that
legal services will be provided for the unrepresented and the under-represented. Pro bono activities should be viewed as an integral part of a lawyer's
ordinary activities because, as will be discussed later, lawyers are engaged in
a profession. Public service is an integral concept of professionalism. 12
A. BAR EFFORTS AT MANDATING PRO BONO

Since 1977, state bars have attempted to impose mandatory pro bono
work on their members with very little success. 3 The ABA has also
one third of individual pro bono clients were relatives and friends. Additionally, of the
organizations receiving assistance, an overwhelming eighty-two percent were churches,
hospitals, and middle class oriented community groups such as the Boy Scouts, Jaycees,
Masons, and garden clubs. Joel L. Handler, et al., The Public Interest Activities of Private
PracticeLawyers, 61 A.B.A. J. 1388, 1389 (1975). The reason these activities are not included
in the definition of pro bono work is because those activities do not benefit the public at large
and, more to the point, the groups who are recipients of these legal services, unlike indigents,
are able to pay for these services.
11. Some commentators opine that the crisis in legal services to the poor is not
remedied by lawyers participating in programs that help feed the hungry or house the homeless.
See Barr, supra note 8, at 54. See also ABA Endorses 50-HourPro Bono Minimum, Opposes
Statutory Removal of U.S. Judges, 61 U.S.L.W. 2479 (Feb. 16, 1993) [hereinafter ABA
Endorses 50-Hour] (detailing the American Bar Association's adoption of a model rule
requiring lawyers to perform fifty hours of free legal services per year exclusive of time donated
to charitable, religious, civic, and public interest organizations). Nonetheless, because this
article addresses the broader issue of the ideals of professionalism, and charitable work such as
the aforementioned benefits the public at large these services will be considered.
12. There are contrary arguments that pro bono work should be done in the lawyers'
"spare time" or considered "charity." See Cynthia R. Watkins, Note, In Support of a Mandatory
Pro Bono Rule for New York State, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 177, 205 (1991); Timothy P. Terrell &
James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism," 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 429 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 12 (documenting New York efforts and resolution
regarding voluntary pro bono activities - Marrero Committee); Gregory A. Hearing, Comment,
Funding Legal Services for the Poor: Florida'sIOTA Program- Now Is the Time To Make It
Mandatory, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (1988) (discussing the Florida Bar's use of interest
earned on trust accounts to fund legal aid to poor); Benjamin L. Cardin & Robert S. Rhudy,
Expanding Pro Bono Legal Assistance in Civil Cases to Maryland'sPoor,49 MD. L. REV. 1
(1990). One state, Oregon, has adopted an eighty hour requirement in their pro bono scheme.
Philip Carrizosa, Mandatory Pro Bono Debate Renewed, THE DAILY J., Feb. 28, 1989.
Additionally, seven local bar associations in Florida, Texas, Illinois, and Wisconsin impose
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continually attempted to set pro bono guidelines for state bars to adopt. 4 One
such rejected proposal included:
A lawyer should render unpaid public interest legal service.

A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing

professional service to persons of limited means or to public
service or charitable groups or organizations or by service
in activities such as improving the law, the legal system, or
the legal profession.'
Following the ABA recommendation, many bar associations adopted

voluntary guidelines for their members. 6
In February 1993, the ABA finally adopted a model ethics rule that states

lawyers should perform at least fifty hours of free legal services per year.' 7
The extremely controversial rule (adopted by a vote of 228 to 215) is
expressly couched as an aspirational goal and is not binding unless state bar
regulators adopt it for their own jurisdictions. 8 Judging by the opposition
aired at the ABA House of Delegates meeting, the new rule "will have a hard
time making it into the ethics codes of the various jurisdictions."' 9
The fact thit the ABA and state bars are having considerable difficulty
adopting a policy about pro bono service underscores the resistance. Some
proponents go as far as suggesting that the federal judiciary's refusal to
compel attorneys to serve the courts "helps to explain the American Bar
Association's refusal to create a program of mandatory pro bono publico." 20

mandatory pro bono. Id.
14. Watkins, supra note 12, at 186 (noting that in 1977 the ABA Special Committee
on Public Interest Practice recommended that state and local bars adopt certain guidelines
including the amount of pro bono work, buy-out provisions, and how to meet the pro bono
requirements).
15. Howard A. Matalon, Note, The Civil Indigent's Last Chance for Meaningful Access
to the Federal Courts: The Inherent Power to Mandate Pro Bono Publico, 71 B.U. L. REv. 545,
548 (1991) (arguing that the federal judiciary, particularly the district courts, have the inherent
power to implement a program of mandatory pro bono publico for indigent civil litigants).
16. Watkins, supra note 12, at 186 (citing Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't
Disappear,NAT'LL.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1, col.3).
17. The ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 6.1 was amended. As
amended the rule provides "[a] lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono
publico legal services per year." (emphasis added). See also ABA Endorses 50-Hour,supra note
I and accompanying text.
18. Although not binding, the codes of ethics are used as a primary instrument for
attaining self-fulfillment, recognition, and enhancing occupational status and self-image. Thus,
it is hoped that even though only an aspirational goal, many lawyers will desire to reach that
goal.
19. ABA Endorses 50-Hour, supra note 11, at 2480.
20. Matalon, supra note 15, at 548 (arguing that the federal judiciary, particularly the
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Proponents of mandatory pro bono, nevertheless, continue to advance various
arguments in favor of imposing mandatory pro bono.
B. STATUTORY OBLIGATION

Some support for the conscription of lawyer's services to the underrepresented is found in the Attorney's Oath. This Oath, required by several
states upon admittance to the bar, provides that an attorney has an obligation
never to reject the cause of the defenseless for personal reasons. 2 ,
Courts have interpreted this provision differently. For example, two
California courts have interpreted this language as mandating pro bono
services,22 while one court has construed the language as "requesting" pro
bono activities from lawyers.23
In County of Fresno v. SuperiorCourt,24 the California Court of Appeals
held that counsel appointed by the court to represent an indigent defendant
was expected "to serve gratuitously." In that case, the lower court ordered the
County of Fresno to pay, from the county's general fund, the fees and costs of

a private attorney appointed to defend an indigent prisoner.25 The county
petitioned for a writ of mandate to set aside the court's order contending that
the payment of attorney's fees and
the court was without authority to order
27
2 The court of appeals agreed.
costs. '
The court of appeals conceded that an indigent prisoner who is sued in
a private civil action is entitled to a "meaningful opportunity to be heard"

district courts, have the inherent power to implement a program of mandatory pro bono publico
for indigent civil litigants).
21. Mortimer D. Schwartz & Richard C. Wydick, Problems in Legal Ethics 31 (1988).
California has codified this obligation in the California Business and Profession Code. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 6068, subd. (h) ("Duties of Attorney. It is the duty of an attorney to do
all of the following: ... Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself,
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.").
22. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Superior Ct., 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that counsel appointed by the court to represent an indigent
defendant is expected to serve gratuitously based on § 6068); Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d
565 (Cal. 1976) (in dicta stating that attorneys are expected to serve without compensation as
part of their public service).
23. See Cunningham v. Superior Ct., 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The court in Cunninghamopined that requiring attorneys to provide free
legal service was not conclusively decided by the legislature and expressly rejected the dicta to
the contrary found in Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1976). See also Mallard v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. for So. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
24. 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
25. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
26. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
27. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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which may constitutionally require court appointment of counsel to represent
him.2" The court concluded, however, that it was "for the legislature to
decide"29 if and how counsel was to be compensated. The court of appeals
noted that it did not possess the power to require expenditure of public funds
for compensating attorneys appointed to represent indigent prisoner defendants and even proclaimed that "attorneys are expected to serve gratuitously
as part of their public responsibilities."3
Similarly, in Payne v. Superior Court," the California Supreme Court
stated in dicta that attorneys are expected to serve without compensation as
part of their public service. The court found that an indigent's rights under the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses were violated if the indigent did not
have meaningful access to the courts, such as an inability to obtain counsel.32
The court nevertheless held that it did not possess the power to require
expenditure of public funds for that purpose and that attorneys were expected
to serve gratuitously.33
In contrast, the California Court of Appeals in Cunningham v. Superior
Court,34 opined that requiring attorneys to provide free legal service was not
conclusively decided by the legislature and expressly rejected the dicta found
in Payne.35 After an exhaustive review of the "traditional view" of the
conscription of pro bono counsel and noting the changing status of attorneys
in American society, the court held that the impressment of attorneys to
handle pro bono litigation denied the attorney equal protection of the law.36
The court reasoned that such a requirement affected similarly situated groups
in an unequal manner. Namely, attorneys, unlike other professionals, were
effectively forced to "give away" their property. The court further reasoned
that compelling pro bono services not only discouraged attorney participation
in voluntary programs, but also denied the indigent effective assistance of
counsel by requiring attorneys to take cases about which they are not
zealous.3s
28. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The court of appeals relied on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Payne v. Superior Ct., 553 P.2d at 579.
29. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 194, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
30. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 194-95, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
31. 553 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1976).
32. Id. at 569-576.
33. Id.
34. 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
35. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 340-41, 222 Cal. Rptr. 856-57.
36. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
37. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
38. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 355, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 866 ("We would hope that every attorney
would derive satisfaction from a job done well, but it may be unrealistic to expect the
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In resolving the conflict between two constitutional rights-the indigent
defendant's constitutional right to legal counsel and the attorney's constitutional right to equal protection of the law-the court concluded that if the
superior court could not appoint qualified counsel willing to represent the
indigent defendant without compensation, the court could not proceed with the
action unless the county or the state provided reasonable compensation for the
appointed counsel.3 9
C. PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATION

Some commentators and courts have found a basis for mandatory pro
bono in the lawyer's professional obligation to provide public service or
public interest work.4 ° They argue the lawyer's status as a professional
encompasses a duty to aid the indigent and address social problems such as
AIDS, resurgent racism, and the devastation of drugs like "crack."'" Authors
Timothy Terrell and James Wildman argue that the function of professionalism is to "reach beyond the basic and uninspiring values enforced by the
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility,and demonstrate that lawyers share, or ought to share, higher,
more ambitious moral aspirations."42 Author Deborah Rhode agrees: "An
ostensibly altruistic involvement in pro bono activity is one of the tradi-tional
'
'signs and symbols' used to distinguish professionals from the laity."43
The obligation to provide public service arises from the practice of law
as a profession. Roscoe Pound, in discussing the legal profession, defined a
"profession" as "an organization of individuals in pursuit of a learned art with
a spiritof public service."" This definition contrasts with his definition of a
"trade," which usually refers to an occupation primarily engaged in a money
making venture.45 Pound concedes that the idea of gaining a livelihood is

satisfaction which arises from performing a charitable act to constitute the sole motivation to
expend maximum effort.").
39. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 357, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68.

40. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965); In re Snyder,
734 F.2d 334, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1984).
41.
42.

Barr, supra note 8, at 54.
Terrell & Wildman, supranote 12, at 413. Terrell and Wildman recognize that it

is difficult to discuss any "shared professional aspirations" because of the moral diversity within

the legal profession. They argue, nevertheless, that lawyers can agree that there is some

difference between "proper" and "improper" conduct, notwithstanding the fact that we cannot
agree where the line between the two should be drawn. Id. at 418.

43. Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on
ProfessionalCodes, 59 TEX. L .REV. 689, 697-701 (1981).
44. RosCOE POuND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TMEs 4 (1953).

45.

Id.
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involved in all callings.' However, making money is the main, if not the only,
purpose in a trade. In a profession, making money is only incidental.
Various court opinions acknowledge that the practice of law is a
profession. For example, in County of Fresnov. Superior Court,47 the court's
expectation of gratuitous service was founded on the lawyer's professional
status: "[T]he practice of law is a professional privilege conferred by the state,
one of the conditions of which is [a professional obligation] which attaches to
those who perform [these] services."4
Similarly, in United States v. Dillon,49 the Ninth Circuit relied upon the
view that lawyers have a professional responsibility to provide free representation.' In Dillon, the petitioner appealed from a judgment of the District Court
for the District of Oregon awarding to an attorney reasonable fees and costs
in a suit to set aside the defendant's sentence."1 The court of appeals reversed
the judgment.5 2 The court of appeal's opinion suggested that the traditions of
the legal profession obligate the attorney to represent indigent defendants
without compensation. The court observed, "Representation of [the] indigent
is a traditional professional obligation of the bar, which the lawyer undertakes
when he becomes a member of the bar."5" The court further observed that an
applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of
this obligation.'
Echoing this sentiment, United States Supreme Court Justice Edward
Kennedy observed in Mallardv. United States:5
Lawyers, like all those who practice a profession, have
obligations to the State. Lawyers also have obligations by
virtue of their special status as officers of the court.
Accepting a court's request to represent the indigent is one
of those traditional obligations. Our judgment here does not
suggest otherwise. To the contrary, it is precisely because

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
Id.
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 636.
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).

52. Id. at 635. The court of appeals ruled on the question whether representation of the
indigent in the case was a taking of property for public use. Id.
53. Id. at 636.
54. Id. at 635.
55. 490 U.S. 296 (1989).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19

our duties go beyond what the law demands that ours
remains a noble profession. 6
Since the practice of law is indeed a profession, doing well or succeeding
as an attorney must encompass more than merely maximizing income.
Lawyers have a "special obligation to ensure a legal system that protects the
rights of individuals and their political, civil, and religious freedoms."57 This
special obligation can be achieved through public service whether it be pro
bono activities or some other form of public aid.
D. THE LEGAL MONOPOLY

Others have argued that lawyers are obliged to offer public service
because lawyers have created a monopoly on the system due to the crucial role
they play in the public justice system.58 W. Clark Durant argues that the legal
monopoly rests not only upon specific laws that set aside work exclusively for
lawyers and specific laws that prosecute others who perform such work for the
"unauthorized practice of law," but also upon a series of restrictions on how
one may become a lawyer.5 9 The monopoly effect arises from the fact that
courts permit only attorneys to practice law.' The monopoly theory assumes
that the practice of law is an exclusive privilege provided for a select few
"with a stranglehold over the legal service available to the public." 61 This
"stranglehold" enables lawyers to make the cost of legal services prohibitive.6 2
The difficulty of completing a legal education reenforces the effect of the

56. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the So. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
57. Barr, supra note 8, at 54.
58. According to W. Clark Durant:
The greatest barrier to widely dispersed low cost dispute resolution

services for the poor, and for all people could very well be the laws
protecting our profession. They make it a cartel. Like any such laws,
they limit or distort supply; they increase prices; and they create
dislocations in the marketplace.

W. Clark Durant, Maximizing Access to Justice: A Challenge to the Legal Profession reprinted
in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: REsPONSIBxrY

AND REGULATION, 435-38 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Challenge]. See also Matalon, supra note
15; Terrell and Wildman, supra note 12; Robert J. Martineau, The Attorney as an Officer of the
Court: Time to Take the Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C. L. REV. 541, 560 (1984).
59. See Challenge, supra note 58, at 437.
60. It is noteworthy that even in instances where attorneys were not required, pleading
cases without the aid of an attorney places someone, to say the least, at a severe disadvantage.
Moreover, the procedural complexities inherent in many cases and the ability to perform legal
research and present cogent arguments makes the attorney indispensable.
61. Matalon, supra note 15 (citing Martineau, supra note 58).
62. Id.
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legal monopoly. This creates an "elitist attitude" among licensed lawyers
causing incoming attorneys to embrace and perpetuate the existing structure. 3
Advocates contend that the monopoly of the legal system creates "a
public obligation to help ensure the sound workings of the system."" As one
author puts it, this obligation "comes with the territory., 65 In sum, lawyers
have a duty to eliminate the injuries caused by the monopoly. This is
understandable considering the legal profession is "interwoven into every
nook and cranny of American life and society."'
E. TRADITION OF PUBLIC SERVICE

Tradition also supports the argument that attorneys have an obligation
to provide public service. Since the middle of the 19th century, there has been
evidence of some form of legal obligation to the less fortunate. In 1846,
David Hoffman wrote Resolution XVIII to serve as a "moral guide" for the
legal profession. 7 Hoffman poignantly wrote:
To my clients I will be faithful; and in their causes, zealous
and industrious. Those who can afford to compensate me,
must do so; but I shall never close my ear or heart, because
my client's means are low. Those who have none, and who
have just cause, are, of all others, the best entitled to sue, or
be defended, and they shall receive undue portion of my
services, cheerfully given. 8
The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics also contained a duty for lawyers to
represent indigent criminal defendants and to aid in the administration of
justice.'
Courts also have concluded that uncompensated representation of
indigents is rooted in tradition. For example, the Dillon court observed that:

63. Barrow F. Christensen, The Lawyers Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 15.
64. Thomas Ehrlich, Rationing Justice, 34 REC. ASS'N B. CrrY N.Y. 729,743 (1979).
65. Christensen, supra note 63, at 16.
66. Bellacosa, supra note 10. Indeed, there are very few, if any, aspects of life that the
law does not affect in some way.
67. D. Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 752 (2d ed. 1846).

Id. at 758.
Joseph L. Torres & Mildred K. Stansky, In Support of a Mandatory Public Service
Obligation, 29 EMORY L. J. 997,997-98 (1980) (citing ABA CANONS OF PROF. ETHICS, Canons
2, 4 (1937)). For more on the early history see Steven B. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono:
Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZo L. REv. 255, 288-95 (1981).
68.

69.
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[a]n applicant for admission to practice law may justly be
deemed to be aware of the traditions of the profession
which he is joining, and to know that one of these traditions
is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court
order.7 °
Similarly, in In re D.B.,7' the court noted that the "common law obligation of the profession to represent the poor" was also an obligation of modem
practice and noted the "historical concept that one who is allowed the
privilege to practice law accepts a professional obligation to defend the
poor."'72 United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, "The
lawyer's duty to provide professional assistance to the poor is part of the
ancient traditions of the bar long recognized by this Court and the courts of
several States."73
This tradition of uncompensated indigent representation has convinced
some people that lawyers have an obligation to provide pro bono services.74
Justice Cardozo, then of the New York Court of Appeals, is one such person:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an
officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice. His co-operation
with the court was due, whenever justice would be imperiled if co-operation was withheld. He might be assigned as
counsel for the needy, in causes criminal or civil, serving
without pay.75
F. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MANDATORY PRO BONO PROGRAMS

There are many reasons, philosophical, practical, and legal, given in
opposition to mandatory pro bono programs. Some opponents of mandatory
pro bono argue that free legal services to the poor and less advantaged does

70. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965).
71. 385 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
72. Id. at 92.
73. Mallard, 409 U.S. at 313.
74. See Cunningham v. Superior Ct., 177 Cal. App. 3d 336,341-44,222 Cal. Rptr. 854,
856-59 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) and cases cited therein.
75. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487,489 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted).

19991

MANDATORY PRO BONO

not lead to the conclusion that it is the duty of an individual lawyer to provide

such services.7 6 These critics suggest that increasing funding for legal services
programs is a more appropriate response to servicing legal needs of the poor.'
Opponents of mandatory pro bono reject the notion that the lawyer's
professional status mandates pro bono service, citing the example of the
medical profession which does not require doctors to perform services without
compensation. 8 Opponents of mandatory pro bono perceive lawyers to be no
different from doctors. This conviction is articulated in The Uncompensated
7
Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression
wherein the author stated:
Just as it would seem that the services of a doctor, a
plumber, or a barber are his 'property' within the constitutional sense of the word, it should logically follow that the
services of a lawyer constitute his 'property.' For just as a
grocer, a clothing store owner, and an automobile dealer sell

their goods, a doctor, a plumber, a barber, and a lawyer sell

their services. It would be interesting to observe the uproar
if an automobile dealer were required to give free cars to

indigents or a barber were required to give free haircuts...

[The attorney] is deprived of equal protection of the laws
when he is compelled to perform services without compen-

sation while no other profession is so required to give its
goods or services free of charge.'0

76. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 735, 738-39 (1980). See also State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971).
77. Watkins, supra note 12,at 181. An increase in funding for legal services would (1)
increase the availability of legal services by making it possible to provide more full-time
attorneys with expertise in poverty issues, and (2) provide resources to increase salary levels to
attract attorneys to legal services programs. Id. This would be satisfactory if we believe that
the basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to afford these services
ultimately rests upon the shoulders of a select few in the legal profession. To the contrary, the
underlying theme of this Comment is that this responsibility rests upon the individual lawyer
and every lawyer should find time to participate. For the same reason, alternatives such as a
"buy-out" provision, whereby attorneys donate money in lieu of their time, and a delegation
option, whereby a firm can delegate certain attorneys to provide pro bono activities for the entire
firm, fail to address the responsibilities of the individual lawyers. Id.
78. Knox County Council v. State, 29 N.E.2d 405,412 (Ind. 1940).
79. Bill Deatherage, Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A
Constitutionaland Social Transgression, 60 KY. L.J. 710 (1972).
80. Id. at 715. See also State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Mo. 1971) (Finch, C.J.,
dissenting) ("What reason is there ...that attorneys should be asked or expected to assume this
heavy burden and serve without compensation and at their own expense? I-perceive none.").
See also Robert S. Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts - A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE & COM.
3, 12 (1969) ("Simple justice indicates that a government that has decreed that an indigent
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Further, opponents suggest that the poor may not receive quality legal
services from lawyers who feel they are being forced to work for free."' This
would result from lawyers' "tendency to put paying time before non-paying
time." 2 Finally, opponents argue that the administrative burden, such as
monitoring and enforcing the lawyers' performance, would create a barrier
that may outweigh the advantages of such a program."

1. ConstitutionalGrounds4
Case decisions support the arguments made by mandatory pro bono

5 the Superior
opponents. For example, in Cunningham v. Superior Court,"

Court of Ventura County ordered an attorney to represent an indigent
defendant in a paternity action instituted by the county. 6 The superior court
defended its action by relying on both the California Business and Professions

Code § 6068(h) and the dicta in Payne v. Superior Court,7 which stated that

defendant has a right to valuable services has the corollary duty to provide the compensation
for such services."). We cannot assume, however, that the profession of law is the same thing
as an association of grocers, plumbers, or automobile dealers. The legal profession is of
paramount importance in the administration ofjustice. It is only with this justice and protection
of civil rights that we can even begin to talk about the possibility of becoming a grocer,
plumber, or automobile dealer. Also, other businesses and occupations have no statutory or
professional obligation such as the Business and Professions Code obligation. Thus, they can
be distinguished from the profession of law. Finally, maybe the legal profession should step to
the forefront with respect to public service rather than use other professions as an excuse not
to provide such assistance.
81. Carrizosa, supra note 13.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 12, at 179. An abbreviated response to the
administrative burden contention is that the same methodology used to monitor Continued Legal
Education (CLE) for active bar members could be used. Notwithstanding the large population
of attorneys, CLE administrators seem to have very little difficulty monitoring all attorneys and
their respective CLE credits.
84. The constitutionality of mandated pro bono is beyond the scope of this article and
will be only briefly explored here. Opponents of mandatory pro bono, however, have raised
constitutional arguments under the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Edward
A. Adams, Wachtler Defers Mandatory Pro Bono, N.Y.L. J., May 2, 1990, at 2, col. 3
(observing "involuntary servitude," "taking without compensation," "due process," and "equal
protection" arguments have been made in response to mandatory pro bono rules). No federal
court has sustained the constitutional challenge. State courts have, however, found compulsory
appointments unconstitutional under both state and federal constitutional provisions. For a
discussion of the federal and state court views and also the views of numerous commentators
see Peter Rofes' excellent and exhaustive study Peter K. Rofes, Ducking the Question: Some
Observationson Mallard v. United States District Court and the Case of the Unwilling Lawyer,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 1129 (1990). See also sources cited within this section.
85. 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
86. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 338, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
87. 553 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1976).
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attorneys are required to serve gratuitously.88 The attorney refused, arguing

among other things that forcing him to represent the defendant denied him

equal protection of the laws. 9 The superior court disagreed and held him in
9

contempt. 0
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of California

reversed. 9' The court of appeals reasoned that requiring lawyers to devote
time to represent indigents might not offend equal protection principles if all
lawyers were required to do so and the burden was borne evenly.' The court
thus held that requiring the attorney to provide legal services without
compensation was to deny him equal protection of the law.93 The court
additionally held that an attorney who is appointed to represent an indigent
defendant without compensation is effectively forced to give away his
"property" and as such the appointment is an unjust taking of property without

just compensation which violates the Fifth Amendment."

In Mallard v. U.S. District Courtfor Southern District of Iowa,95 the
United States Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision,' that a federal court
could not require an attorney to represent any person claiming in forma
pauperis status. 9' However, even though the Court was faced with the
constitutionality of mandating such service, the Court decided the case on

88.
89.

90.

177 Cal. App. 3d at 340-41, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57.
177 Cal. App: 3d at 339, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 855.

Id.

91. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 356-57, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. First, the court stated it
"[did] not believe the Payne majority intended to make a ruling with such profound
constitutional implications, based on dicta in a footnote. The court of appeals next rejected the
profession argument, stating that the "uncompensated impressment" of attorneys was not
justified simply because the practice of law is a "professional privilege." 177 Cal. App. 3d at
341, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 857. The court similarly rejected the argument that the duty to represent
indigent defendants was an ancient tradition: "A careful exam of the 'deeply rooted' and
'ancient tradition' reveals a custom far more honored in its breach than its observance." The
court further noted a policy disadvantage of compelled altruism - discouraging the right to
effective assistance of counsel. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
92. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 349, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862. The court could not itself envision
an acceptable method because the selection of specific attorneys to provide such services was
fraught with problems. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 350-51, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
93. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 347-51, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862-64.
94. Id. But cf United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965) (rejecting a
takings claim).
95. 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
96. Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices.White, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and O'Connor. Id. at 297.
97. Id. at 298.
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other grounds.98 In Mallard,the Volunteer Lawyers Project99 selected John
Mallard to represent three indigent inmates who were instituting an action
against prison administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 19 8 3 ."° Mallard moved to
withdraw as counsel citing inexperience in litigation matters and lack of
knowledge of section 1983 matters.'' Mallard also maintained that compulsory appointments violated constitutional guarantees.0 2 The district court
refused to dismiss the appointment, but the Supreme Court reversed.0 3
The Mallarddecision actually turned on the interpretation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d). 4 The pertinent section of 1915 provides: "The court may request
an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may
dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or is satisfied that the
action is frivolous or malicious. '' Thus, the Court did not resolve the
constitutionality of mandatory pro bono requirements. The Court also failed
to resolve whether a federal court may compel an unwilling attorney to
represent indigent litigants. In authoring the majority opinion, Justice
Brennan stressed:
We emphasize that our decision today is limited to interpreting § 1915(d)'. We do not mean to question, let alone
denigrate, lawyers' ethical obligation to assist those who are
too poor to afford counsel, or to suggest that requests made
pursuant to § 1915(d) may be lightly declined because they
give rise to no ethical claim. On the contrary, in a time
when the need for legal services among the poor is growing
and public funding for such services has not kept pace,
lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer their time and skills
pro bonopublico is manifest. Nor do we express an opinion
98. Id. at 308 n.8.
99. The Volunteer Lawyers Project is a joint venture of the Legal Services Corporation
of Iowa and the Iowa State Bar Association. Id. at 298.
100. Id. at 298-99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for civil actions for the deprivation of
rights. The statute states: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
101. Id. at 209.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 298-300.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertains to person claiming informa pauperis status, i.e., a person
unable to afford counsel. Section (d) relates to the appointment of counsel in circumstances
where persons claim such status. See also Mallard, 490 U.S. at 298.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (emphasis added).
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on the question whether the federal courts possess inherent
authority to require lawyers to serve. Although respondents
and their amici urge us to affirm the Court of Appeals'
judgment on the ground that the federal courts do have such
authority, the District Court did not invoke its inherent
power in its opinion below, and the Court of Appeals did
not offer this ground for denying Mallard's application for
a writ of mandamus. We therefore leave that issue for
another day. We hold only that § 1915(d) does not authorize the federal courts to make coercive appointments of
counsel."o6
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to decide whether mandatory
appointment of an attorney is constitutional, state courts have not been
reluctant. 0 7 By way of example, an Indiana state court defined the issue as
this: "To the attorney his profession is his means of livelihood ...[and is] no
more at the mercy of the public, as to remuneration, than are the goods of the
merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the mechanic."' ' Other
state courts have followed this reasoning.1°9
Commentators disagree about the constitutionality of mandatory pro
bono. For example, Rosenfeld argues that a mandatory appointment is not a
"taking" where the government is enforcing a preexisting obligation owed to
the public."0 He urges that uncompensated appointments are not "involuntary
servitude" in which the government is calling for service to meet a public need
and one is free to choose another calling."' Rosenfeld contends uncompensated appointment is not an "equal protection" violation where there is a

106. Mallard,490 U.S. at 310. Justice Kennedy, in a brief concurrence, also noted the
limited holding of the court, stating that "[the] decision today speaks to the interpretation of a
statute, to the requirements of the law, and not to the professional responsibility of the lawyer."
Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens notes in his dissent, the very fact
that Mallard found it appropriate to seek withdrawal from his appointment reflects Mallard's
recognition of a duty to accept the appointment absent some valid reason. Id. at 316-17.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
107.

See supra note 84.

110.

See infra note 112.

108. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13,17 (Ind. 1854). See also Mower v. Superior Ct., 155 Cal.
App. 3d 262, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating lawyers may not be
compelled to give away portion of their livelihood); Cunningham v. Superior Ct., 177 Cal. App.
3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (stating any public duty owed to litigants
should not be borne by lawyers).
109. See Rofes, supra note 84, at 1139 for a list of various state court decisions.
111.

Id.
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rational relationship 2 with the government's interest and the requirement
reaches all lawyers."

Likewise, Professor Fisch argues that lawyers can be compelled to
represent indigent litigants. Fisch's position is a compromise though. Fisch
argues that only in extraordinary instances when all alternative avenues have

been exhausted should unwilling lawyers be compelled to represent indigent
litigants."' 3
2. Other Grounds

In addition to raising Equal Protection claims," 4 involuntary servitude
claims," 5 and "takings" claims," 6 lawyers have opposed imposing on lawyers
a duty to provide free legal assistance to indigents on various non-constitutional grounds. These grounds include contentions that even if all lawyers
7
".
donated their services, the needs of all the poor would not be met, and
pro bono services a
resentment will arise if the law makes mandatory
8
law."
practicing
of
condition for the privilege
Opponents also cite the changing status of the lawyer in American
society. They contend lawyers occupy a less privileged position today.
Because of the loss of privilege, lawyers no longer need to fulfill any
9
professional obligation that may have once existed at different times."
They also argue that providing free legal services is not an "ancient
tradition of the bar." Indeed, Shapiro states that "the notion that an unwilling
lawyer could be forced to serve without fee... seems never to have found

112. Watkins, supra note 12, at 198 n. 101 (citing Rosenfeld, supra note 69; See also
Cardin & Rhudy, supra note 13; Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A
Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18, 65-68 (1990)).
113. Rofes, supra note 84, at 1139 (citing William B. Fisch, Coercive Appointments of
Counsel in Civil Cases in Forna Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes Hard Law, 50 Mo. L. REV.
527 (1985)).
114. See Cunningham v. Superior Ct., 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
115. Adams, supra note 84, at 2. col. 3. See also Terrell & Wildman, supra note 12, at
430 (arguing that a "perverted" form of professionalism, one of professionalism as indentured
servitude, would be created by the imposition of a personal obligation to give assistance to the
poor).
116. Id. See also County of Fresno v. Superior Ct., 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr.
880 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (Hopper, J., dissent); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, (Mo.
197 1) (Finch, C.J., dissent).
117. Carrizosa, supra note 13.
118. Id. See also Watkins, supra note 12, at 198 (describing the situation as one
whereby an attorney, taking on a case simply to satisfy his or her obligation under the rule,
would not represent the client zealously (the "reluctant advocate")).
119. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 345.
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universal acceptance."''

Shapiro concludes that "[t]o justify coerced,

uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm tradition in England and
' 2

the United States is to read into that tradition a story that is not there."' 1
Furthermore, mandatory pro bono opponents respond to the "legal
monopoly" argument by stressing that the argument fails to explain why
licensed professionals in other monopolies are not obligated to provide
professional services to the indigent." Opponents also assert that it is not
necessary to be an attorney to represent yourself and your interests,' and no
24
barriers exist to enter law school and, hence, into the legal profession.

Finally, critics argue that the intense competition within the legal profession
undoes any effect a monopoly would ordinarily create. 25

These responses, however, fail to consider the economic and academic
barriers to law schools such as the enormous cost, the entrance exams, and the
time necessary to attend law school. Moreover, assuming these are not
barriers for all persons desiring to attend law school, the fact that there are no
barriers does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a monopoly does not

still in fact exist. What it may imply is simply that there are more people

entering the monopoly." 6
Although anyone can represent himself or herself in court, the procedural
complexities of legal proceedings, coupled with a lay person's lack of legal
27
training and the lack of legal resources will, assuredly, handicap that person.
120. Shapiro, supra note 76.
121. Id. at 753.
122. See, e.g., Matalon, supra note 15, at 559. See also Bruce Andrew Green, Comment
Court Appointment ofAttorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal
Assistance, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 366, 389 (1981) ("I'he enjoyment of a monopoly does not in
itself distinguish attorneys from nurses, teachers, insurance agents, brokers, pharmacists, and
other groups subject to state licensing or regulatory authority.").
123. Matalon, supra note 15, at 558.
124. Terrell & Wildman, supra note 12, at 420.
125. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Pro Bono Obligation, in PROCEEDING OF THE
SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC 101 (ABA 1979).

126. The legal system cannot be a "monopoly" in the truest sense of the word, i.e., one
or two entities controlling an entire market. But, the monopoly argument does reflect the
public's understanding that attorneys determine who can become attorneys, and, it is the
attorneys who police themselves.
127. We must keep in mind to whom we are referring-indigent litigants. The
adversarial process is based on an underlying assumption that both parties to a suit are roughly
equally represented with respect to legal resources. As such, opposing litigants with substantial
legal resources can unequally and unfairly dictate the outcome of a suit. For arguments that an
attorney is indispensable in the civil process see Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445,450 (9th
Cir. 1962) ('That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained laymen
may appear intricate and mysterious"); Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1983)
("[S]urviving a critical motion to dismiss ...may well depend upon the ability to perform legal
research and present sophisticated legal arguments in such... areas as prisoner medical rights
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To ensure sound and informed disposition of controversies and to further
ensure that those already handicapped are not further handicapped by
inadequate representation, attorneys are indispensable in legal proceedings.
Finally, the concept that intense competition undoes the effect of a
monopoly may be accurate in that competition generated by the relaxation of
the monopoly will reduce attorney costs. That effect, however, does not
address the problem. First, few, if any, attorneys will compete to represent
indigent clients. Second, no amount of competition will provide assistance to
the truly indigent. Attorneys may represent indigents for ulterior motives,

such as for publicity or to further their own goals, but those who truly need
help will often be overlooked. This leaves people with certain types of legal
disputes that should be litigated without counsel. As a result, many cases
where injustices, inequalities, and prejudices underlie the dispute will not be

heard. There will be no enforcement of a victim's statutory or constitutional
right; this would render that right meaningless. 128

If.REDEFINING THE DEBATE
Plainly stated, there is an unfortunate trend away from providing public
service. There is a breed of lawyer for whom the law is simply the making of
a livelihood. The marble hallways, large offices, exorbitant pay, and the
prestige of a law firm blind many individuals to the special role they can play
in society. Beyond this, the mandatory pro bono issue is merely a smaller
issue in a grand scheme. The debate over mandatory pro bono exposes a
larger issue that must be addressed: whether lawyers have an ethical or moral
or free speech. These are skills which a layman often may not have and in which a lawyer
receives professional training."); Matalon, supra note 15, at 562 ("[Ihe likelihood of success
of an indigent civil litigant may depend more upon the presentation of counsel than on the
nature of the claim itself.").
128. Professor Deborah Rhode contends "the debate over mandatory public service
contributions has been mostly sound and fury." She continues with alternative suggestions "[a]n entity concerned more with substance than self-image would have invested its energy in
proposals with greater potential for enhancing access to justice, such as alternative forms of
dispute resolution or relaxation of the professional monopoly." Deborah L. Rhode, Why the
ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REV. 689, 701
(1981). While both alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and a relaxation of the professional
monopoly may cure other problems in the legal system, such as court congestion, and combating
costs and length of time of traditional litigation, it is unclear to this author how these
alternatives will actually address the pro bono issue. Pro bono is not merely a concern for "selfimage" (if what is meant by that term is that lawyers are concerned primarily with the public
perception of lawyers). By providing assistance to the indigent, lawyers can generate a sense of
self-respect within the legal community. The respect of the public can be achieved after lawyers
generate and maintain a sense of internal self respect by bringing about a better understanding
of the role of an attorney. Fuller & Randall, supra note 4, at 1216.

1999]

MANDATORY PRO BONO

obligation to do more than maximize their income, the ideal of professionalism. The debate over mandatory pro bono is fueled by a faulty definition of
"doing well" or "succeeding" as an attorney. This definition is inextricably
linked with maximizing one's income. A change in this definition can result
in changes throughout the legal profession.
It is clear some lawyers feel their profession requires more than merely
maximizing income. 29 That view, however, is not shared by all. While the
pro bono activities of some individual lawyers and private firms have been
exemplary, the pro bono activities of most private practitioners are "sporadic
and devoid of an ongoing commitment to public-interest law."' 3 It is both
perplexing and disturbing that 80-90% of practicing lawyers do nothing about
public service or fulfilling their commitment to their "higher calling." The
reasons lawyers give for this shortcoming almost always refers to monetary
gain or loss and the desire to succeed. Many attorneys simply feel that pro
bono service and profits have to conflict.'
This emphasis upon monetary gain has caused the practice of law to
become less than gratifying for a majority of attorneys. By defining success
solely in monetary terms, lawyers have transmuted the profession of law into
a trade. As such, the only emphasis is upon making money. The pressures
and drudgery associated with working in the legal trade are the factors leading
to rising discontent among attorneys. Unhappy, many attorneys look to other
fields after only a few years in the legal profession.3 2
A. UNHAPPY LAWYERS

There is a problem in the legal profession-lawyers are unhappy. Some
have called it a "national trend,"'3 others a "major problem."" Consequently,

129. See infra, Section liA; See also n.138.
130. Marshall,'supra note 7.
131. Barr, supra note 8, at 54. It should be noted, indeed stressed that the Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility make a lawyer's obligation to accept or refuse a pro bono case
contingent upon that particular lawyer's financial situation. Model Rule 6.2(b) allows a lawyer
to refuse a pro bono case if taking the case would result in "an unreasonable financial burden.
132. Paul Ciotti, Unhappy Lawyers; They're Highly Trained and Highly Paid, So Why
Do Many Feel So Low About Their Jobs? L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1988, at El (noting that in their
first three years of practice, half of all lawyers change jobs, with some firms losing as many as
a quarter of their members every year).
133. Out of Practice Unhappy Lawyers Leaving the Profession, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Mar. 12, 1990, at B16 [hereinafter Out of Practice].
134. Tim Poor, Lawyers Like Their Job Less, ST. LOuis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 20,1990,
at IC.
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35
lawyers are abandoning the profession at an alarming rate.' The aim here is
not to document the number of unhappy lawyers nor catalogue all of the
factors contributing to their unhappiness. That task is formidable, if not
impossible. The objective of this section is merely to capture the flavor of the
of lawyers' dissatisfaction and some reasons behind
seriousness and the extent
36
the dissatisfaction.
When talking about the unhappiness of lawyers, and more specifically,
the reasons for it, two questions should be asked and answered. The first
question is: who am I? In other words, what is it that I am looking for as a
person and as an attorney? Attorneys who are interested in being happy must
have more in mind than being in this profession for the money. The merit of
this position is self-evident.
The second question is: is working in the legal profession really
worthwhile? It is not worthwhile if we treat the legal profession as a business
without considering the impact attorneys can have on society and mankind.
This is not an overstatement. As will be seen, an overwhelming theme among
unhappy lawyers is that they are not benefitting anyone of significance.
Practicing law can and will be worthwhile if attorneys are able to combine
financial needs with service to others and the legal system. With these two
questions in mind, we turn to the "unhappy lawyer."
In a recent survey, 70% of the lawyers interviewed said they would not
37 Moreover,
choose to become lawyers if they could start all over again.
3
In a
more than 70% would not advise their children to become lawyers.

135. As recently as 1990, Time Magazine put the number of attorneys forsaking the
practice of law at 40,000 each year. Out of Practice,supra note 133.
136. Career dissatisfaction in the legal profession has become a regular topic of
discussion at placement director meetings. Ciotti, supra note 132, at 17. Also, businesses that
help lawyers who have decided they are unhappy in the law find other careers are beginning to
appear. One such example is Lawtematives, a one woman operation that counsels lawyers on
how to leave the legal profession and to help those lawyers decide on other careers. See Cara
Applebaum, Lawternatives:Helping Lawyers Who Want Out, THE AM. L., Dec. 1989, at 74.
For articles discussing the growing number of lawyers dissatisfied with the practice of law and
the various reasons for this dissatisfaction see James E. Brill, The Secret of Success: Need
BalancedLives, Not Necessarily More Billable Hours, 78 A.B.A. J. 100 (Oct. 1992); Marilyn

Tucker et al., Whatever Happened to the Class of 1983?, 78 GEO. L.J. 153 (1989); Ciotti, supra
note 132, at El; Mary Hull, Why Are Lawyers So Miserable?; The Profession'sMalaiseProds
Some in New Directions,TExAS LAWYERS, Apr. 16, 1993; Laura Mansnerus, Why Women Are

Leaving the Law, WORKING WOMEN, Apr. 1993, at 64; Michael Orey, Misery, THE AM. L, Oct.
1993; Out of Practice,supranote 133, at B16; Poor, supra note 134, at IC; William Vogeler,
When It's Bail Out or Burn Out, CI. DAILY L. BULL, Oct. 27, 1992.

137.
138.

Vogeler, supra note 136.
Id.
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similar survey, at least 30% of lawyers indicated that they either did not enjoy
1 39
their work or were at least ambivalent in their feelings about their work.
Further, the alcoholism rate among lawyers is an estimated 15-20%,
almost twice as high as the general population."4 Thirteen percent of the
attorneys polled admitted they had at least six drinks every day. 4 And in
North Carolina, 11% of the lawyers polled admitted they consider taking their
lives at least once a month! 42 If that is not enough, a 1990 survey estimated
that approximately 40,000 lawyers abandon the legal profession each year.'43
Indeed, there is a problem.
Frequently the primary explanation for the unhappiness of lawyers and
the reason many consider leaving the practice of law is that the pressures are
too great. 44 Along these lines, one attorney stated the problem as thislawyers are looking to get out of law because the work is drying up while the
pressure grows to bring in business and bill more hours.145 At the same time,
older lawyers are forced to spend more time in practice and less time training
junior counterparts-leading to dissatisfied and unfulfilled junior attorneys."
One attorney cited "long hours, tedious, grunt work, and the adversarial
nature of the job" as the reasons for his dissatisfaction. 47 With respect to the
long hours, it is not uncommon for private law firms to demand that associates
bill 1,850-2,000 hours a year."' In fact, this is considered the bare minimum
-firms now demand closer to 2,200 hours and some associates are billing as
many as 3,000 hours. 49 Because billable hours generally represent 75-80%

139. Tucker, supra note 136, at 163. This is a significant variation from the previous
70% earlier documented. However, unhappiness in the legal profession is difficult to document.
"For one thing, lawyers in surveys tend to give contradictory information: On the one hand,
many of them report they have a great deal of satisfaction...; at the same time, however, a
study reported in the February, 1984, A.B.A. J. showed that 41% of lawyers would enter another
profession if they had it all to do over again." Ciotti, supra note 132. Professor David
Chambers explains the contradictory attitudes by noting that lawyers getting paid over $60,000
a year to start work are "embarrassed" to say they are miserable. Id.
140. Ciotti, supra note 132.
141. Poor, supra note 134.
142. Maura Dolan, Miserable With the Legal LUfe, L.A. TMES, June 27,1995 at Al.
143. Out of Practice,supra note 133. Incidently, the number of students graduating law
school yearly is estimated at 35,000. Id.
144. Tucker, supra note 136, at 171-72.
145. Debra Cassens Moss, Law Job Trends: More Lawyers Moving, Leaving Law, 76
A.B.A. J. 36 (Apr. 1990).
146. Id.
147.

Out of Practice,supra note 133.

149.

Id.

148.

Ciotti, supra note 132, at 3.
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of the total time lawyers actually work,' the actual time a lawyer spends in
the office can be anywhere from 70-90 hours a week.
Another problem associated with unhappy lawyers is the unrealistic
expectations of newly graduated associates.'' Many lawyers enter the legal
profession thinking they can help people and benefit mankind. 2 In their
book, Lawyers, Law Students and People, Thomas Shaffer and Robert
Redmount argue that students enter law school with "aspirations to be
humanely influential," but many leave finding the law to be "insensitive."'5 3
Those who do leave law school with the same hope of helping people soon
lack an "interest to make the law an instrument for making people better."'' "
Sixty-two percent of graduates polled in a survey found the work to be
what they had expected. 5' However, 19% did not find work to be what they
had expected from the practice of law and 19% were ambivalent."5 6 These
results suggest that students may enter law school with little knowledge of
what to expect from the practice of law and, as a result, often have unrealistic
57
expectations.1
Lawyers who appear to be the most satisfied with their jobs are those
who successfully juggle the demands of their careers with their personal lives
and those who are passionate about what they do.' Often, top salaries are not
the highest priority among contented lawyers."' 9 Indeed, for an increasing
number of lawyers, the bottom line is not maximizing billable hours and
profits. ° As one author stated: "The professional pride of lawyers as a group

150.

151.

Id.

152.

Id. at 2.
Id. (noting that Dianne Sundby, a Los Angeles psychologist who sees many lawyers

153.

Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert S. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students and People

154.

Id.

in her practice states that the lawyers trying to help people soon discover that much of what
lawyers do is benefit corporations not individuals).
(1977).

155. Tucker, supra note 136, at 162. In a survey of recent graduates, the primary reasons
why survey participants decided to attend law school were: (1) desired professional career 43%; (2) considered law a good background - 16%; (3) desired to effect social change - 7%; (4)
uncertain about what else to do - 7%; (5) enjoy oral debate - 6%; (6) prestige - 5%; (7) financial
reward - 2%; (8) other - 14%.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. One attorney quit a $60,000 year job and volunteered at a public defender's office,
where her entire outlook towards the law changed because she was able to "really believe what

[she] was fighting for," representing juvenile defendants and parents whose children had been
taken from them. See Dolan, supra note 142, at A16.
159. Hull, supra note 136, at 2. See also Brill supra note 136 (suggesting that lawyers
with balanced lives are the more successful lawyers).

160.

Heidi Greenberg, CareerCrunch;Breaking Free From the Pack; THE RECORDER,
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has always depended on the belief that what they do has potential to be
personally and intrinsically rewarding."''
One of the most common
complaints about the current practice of law is that the work is meaningless. 6 2
This may be because law practice has become more of a trade or business. As
law firms are increasingly run like businesses, individual associates are
viewed as profit centers. 63 Under the pressure to produce, the first task
eliminated is the non-fee-generating work-public service and pro bono. As
a result, lawyers have less time to help the needy.'" This, in turn, leads to
unhappy and unfulfilled lawyers.
The dissatisfaction among lawyers also has a negative effect upon the
public. Dissatisfied lawyers may be less "enthusiastic" about their cases and
the consequences of the actions. They pay less attention to moral issues
concerning their conduct which colors the public perception of lawyers. This
is further exacerbated by a widespread perception that criminals escape
punishment and lawsuits drag on interminably. As many people see it, "it's
all the lawyers' fault.' 6 Many people have expressed distrust and discomfort
over lawyers' power and morals. If this situation is to change, lawyers must
find a balance between the financial rewards and the ethical challenges to
achieve greater personal satisfaction.'6
Personal satisfaction can help
transform public perception and confidence.
Success or doing well cannot be defined simply by money because there
will never be enough money. "Life must be more than striving for money,
power and position. Money does not bring satisfaction, power is fleeting, and

Apr. 2, 1993, at 8. One attorney took a $100,000 pay cut - "it became clear that there were
things more important than personal wealth." Ciotti, supra note 132, at 5 (quoting John Shean,
a former partner in a major Los Angeles firm who quit his partnership to become president of
the Children's Organ Transplant Ass'n. in Bloomington, Ind.).
161. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FALING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993).
162. Greenberg, supra note 160, at 9.
163. Ciotti, supra note 132, at 19.
164. Id. at 3. Many firms will not openly discourage pro bono work. Nevertheless,
because firms heavily stress assigned attorney income--the amount of billed work actually
collected---associates are discouraged from taking pro bono projects. Additionally, in firms that
fall to weigh pro bono efforts of associates in the associate's evaluations, a further disincentive
is created. For articles discussing various large firm pro bono contributions, see Barr, supra

note 8.
165. Ciotti, supra note 132, at 1. Also quoted in the Ciotti article is a Professor at USC's
business school remarking that all those attending a management conference were in agreement
that "lawyers were the kind of people who caused more trouble than they were worth."
166. Brill, supra note 136 (arguing that by achieving a balance between our personal and
professional lives, lawyers will be happier with themselves and will have "discovered the secret
of success").
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position is even less permanent."'' Those lawyers who initially entered the
legal profession with the sincere intent to provide service to the community
and society, to work hard, and to achieve a good living and a reasonable
amount of respect must continue to strive for such things. Unfortunately, with
the stressful, workaholic paper shuffling, the excessive confrontation and the
lack of respect from others, including colleagues, courts and the public,
discontent is pervasive." Attorneys cannot let money become the main goal
with service to society merely an afterthought. The reverse must be the case.
Referring back to Pound, 69 we are a profession, and as such money should
only be an indirect goal."'
Once the law firms, individual lawyers, and the public redefine success,
lawyers will be able to achieve professional satisfaction, improve the public's
perception of the legal profession, and be happy.
B. REDEFINING "SUCCESS"

For many attorneys, the prevailing definition of success is "a state of
prosperity, in a prosperous or affluent manner or with success from a material
point of view.""' Lawyers striving to achieve this plateau find themselves
working more for money and less towards humanistic goals. Although many
lawyers, regardless of field, will not expressly state that they define "success"
as making the most money possible, this definition of "success" can be
implied. The intensity of mandatory pro bono opponents, the instances of
firms discouraging pro bono,"7 2 and the escalation of billable hours are
evidence that "success" and the health of the profession is measured solely in
73
financial terms.
Although there are multiple definitions of doing "well,""' 4 a preferred
definition of doing "well" is "in accordance with a high standard of morality;
in a way that is morally good, and in a manner that constitutes good treatment

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Greenberg, supra note 160, at 11.
See supra note 44.
See POUND, supra note 44.
171. WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2595 (7th ed. 1966).
172. See Barr, supra note 8.
173. Sources observing how the practice of law has become a business also show by
implication that this is the prevailing definition. See, e.g., Brill, supra note 136, at 3 ("The
culture of many firms is to worship and reward long hours to the exclusion of most other
factors" which in turn leads to dissatisfied and unsuccessful lawyers.).
174. There are fifty-one different definitions of well (excluding those pertaining to
water). This definition precedes the definition focusing solely on financial prosperity. As such,
it is implied that it is of more common usage and hence, the use of the term preferred.
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or confers a benefit."' 75 It is noteworthy that this definition contains no
reference to prosperity or monetary gain. Furthermore, conferring a benefit
upon another is considered synonymous with a high standard of morality. By
adhering to this definition of doing "well" lawyers will be more fulfilled and
the public perception of lawyers and the legal profession will be more
favorable. Moreover, this definition of "well" is more consistent with the
goals of the ABA and more in line with what an ideal lawyer would do. The
ABA's attempt at passing mandatory pro bono work evidences a commitment
to confer a benefit upon society. Also, an ideal lawyer, it seems, is one who
not only has a high standard of morality, but also makes every effort to do
justice to the profession of law by pursuing a spirit of public service.
These ideals of professionalism will cost lawyers some time and money.
Nevertheless, by embracing the need to find moral worth in professional
activities the debate will diminish, society will be served and, equally
important, lawyers will be satisfied in their profession.
HII.THURGOOD MARSHALL: THE PARADIGM OF "DOING WELL" AS A
PROFESSIONAL LAWYER

The late Justice Thurgood Marshall succinctly stated the two potential
roles for lawyers: "You either work to improve society, or you become a
parasite on it."' 76 Marshall held strong views on lawyers' obligations to the
public:
The lawyer has often been seen by minorities, including the
poor, as part of the oppressors in society. Landlords, loan
sharks, businessmen specializing in shady installment credit
schemes-all are represented by counsel on a fairly permanent basis. But who represents and speaks for tenants,
borrowers, and consumers? Many special-interest groups
have permanent associations with retained counsel. Who
speaks for the substantial segment of the populace that such
legislation might disadvantage? Outside of the political
processes, I think the answer is clear. Lawyers have a duty
in addition to that of representing their clients; they have a

175. Id.
176. Glen Darbyshire, Clerking for Justice Marshall, reprinted in ROGER GOLDMAN &
DAVID GALEN, THURGOOD MARSHAL.: JUSTICE rOR ALL 179 (1992) (quoting Justice Thurgood
Marshall).
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duty to represent the public, to be social reformers in
however small a way.""
The life and accomplishments of Justice Marshall .prove that doing
"well" or succeeding as an attorney should encompass providing public
service. He succeeded as an attorney by every objective measure, while
appreciating, acknowledging, and fulfilling his obligation to remedy human
problems. His career was such that Justice William Brennan proclaimed, "Of
no other lawyer can it so truly be said that all Americans owe him an
78
enormous debt of gratitude."'
As the Solicitor General, as a Supreme Court Justice, and as "the leading
civil rights lawyer in the history of the country,"'7 9 Marshall was the epitome
of the professional lawyer. Marshall's life deftly combined excellence with
working for the public good without compromising any aspect of those
pursuits. Marshall's life demonstrated that the definition of "doing well"
preferred by dictionaries should be the definition favored by attorneys. Those
who insist that making money is the only legitimate goal might, justly, be seen
as "parasites." Lawyers who devote some portion of their efforts to the
betterment of society are fulfilling their role for lawyers in society by working
to improve society.
The debate over mandatory pro bono reveals that most modem lawyers
need moral persuasion or legislative coercion to work in pursuit of a cause, or
for the betterment of society. Much of what Marshall accomplished arose
from his deep commitment to end the evil of discrimination. In front of the
courts, and later as a Justice, Marshall fought racial injustice in court
proceedings, 8 ° and racial discrimination in the political process without the
need for legislative coercion." His crowning achievement as a lawyer,
177. Goldman & Gallen, supra note 176, at 29.
178. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 23, 23 (1991).
179. Robert L. Carter, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 33,
34(1991).
180. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) ("Confession" obtained by
means of "third degree" violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Lyons
v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (discussing the effect of a coerced confession on a later
uncoerced confession under the Due Process Clause); Patton v. Mississippi, 322 U.S. 463
(1947) (systemic, purposeful administrative exclusion of Blacks from jury violates the Equal
Protection Clause); Watts v. Indiana, 318 U.S. 49 (1949) (confessions procured under coercion
or conditions violative of the Due Process Clause are inadmissible).
181. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (declaring that an Oklahoma
registration scheme that prevented persons from registering and voting in election unless they
voted-in election two decades earlier, i.e., a "grandfather clause" violates the Fifth Amendment
by discriminating on the basis of race); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (stating refusal
of election judges to allow Black to vote in Texas primary violates Fifteenth Amendment).
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winning the fight for equality for Blacks in schools in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka,' did not require moral persuasion. Rather, his
participation was part of a lifelong effort to combat unequal legislation and
discrimination. The Brown decision opened doorways for the banning of all
other forms of legally sanctioned discrimination.
A. THE EARLY YEARS

Marshall began his unsurpassed service to the law and to this nation after
graduating from Howard University Law School in 1933.13 Upon graduation,
Marshall opened a one man civil and criminal law practice in Baltimore." 4
Initially, he handled divorce cases and claims against property.'
His true
interest, however, was in handling civil rights' cases and helping those who
could not afford the services of an attorney. 6 After a short time, and amidst
the Great Depression, Marshall took many civil rights cases. 7 Not surprisingly, many of his clients had no money and Marshall handled these cases
without compensation for his services.' This is precisely why Marshall was
the epitome of a professional lawyer; because he donated his services and time
frequently without compensation, for the betterment of society. 9
After his first year in practice, Marshall calculated that not only had he
not earned money, he actually lost $1,000 in time and expenses.'" Despite
this, and because of his interest in the welfare of the black community,
Marshall continued his civil rights' work. His interest in civil rights led him
to join the Baltimore branch of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) where Marshall volunteered his services.''
Marshall's practice began to boom as word quickly spread of his
considerable talent, and his passion for indigent clients."9 Eventually,

182.
183.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
MICHAELD. DAVIS & HuNTERR. CLARK, THURGOODMARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE

184.

Id.

BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 11

185.

(1992).

JAMES HASKINS, THURGOOD MARSHALL A LEFE FOR JUSTICE 41 (1992).

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supranote 136, and cases cited therein. Marshall's generosity with his services
went so far that a Baltimore judge referred to Marshall as "a freebie lawyer." DAVIS & CLARK,
supra note 183, at 71. In addition to the ec
target
America for that matter, it is remarkable that he was not only able to survive but succeed.
190. HASKINS, supra note 185, at 41.
191. Id. at 42.
192. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 183, at 71.
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Marshall built up the largest law practice in Baltimore. 9 3 His income,
however, did not rise with his reputation because Marshall used his formidable legal skills in an attempt to end the evils of discrimination rather than to
maximize his income.'"
Although, technically, he maintained his private legal practice, most of
Marshall's professional time was spent on NAACP activities."' While he had
some success in his private practice, the NAACP seldom paid Marshall more
than expenses for his services. 96
Marshall's impressive credentials and devotion to the pursuit of equality
led Charles Hamilton Houston"' to offer Marshall a full-time position as
assistant general counsel for the NAACP's national branch in 1936.' Two
years later, Marshall replaced Houston as NAACP chief counsel.' 99
B. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA

During his years working for the NAACP, Marshall passionately
championed the rights of the oppressed, for very little compensation. When
Marshall began working at the NAACP, he was virtually without legal
resources. 2" He had only one full-time assistant and only a few law books in
the office, which were inadequate for even minimal research."' Working with
low pay and limited resources, Marshall nevertheless struck down barriers that
had prevented blacks from participating in the Democratic Party primaries2 °2
and won a series of cases establishing the rights of black teachers to salaries
equal to those of their white counterparts.2 °3 Finally, in Brown,2" Marshall
won a decision that ended the "separate but equal" doctrine and opened doors
for Blacks by ending legally sanctioned discrimination.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 98.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 97. Houston was the former dean at Marshall's alma mater, Howard law
school. He was also Marshall's mentor and chief national counsel for the NAACP.
198. GOLDMAN & GALEN, supra note 176, at 148.
199. Id. In 1940, Marshall was appointed to the newly created position of DirectorCounsel of the NAACP. IL at 44. This position is responsible for planning the strategy to be
used in the courts and for coordinating the entire legal program. Id. Marshall served in this

capacity for twenty-one years. IdL

200. Carter, supra note 179, at 35.
201. Id.
202. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
203. Carter, supra note 179, at 35. See Alston v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 112
F.2d 992, 996-97 (4th Cir. 1940); Mills v. Board of Educ., 30 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D. Md. 1939);
Mills v. Lowndes, 26 F. Supp. 792, 801 (D. Md. 1939).
204. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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To say the least, legal segregation was entrenched before Marshall began

the assault. Before Brown, laws separating the races were constitutional as
long as the separate facilities were equal. 5 This concept of "separate but

equal" was established in the 1896 decision of Plessy v. Ferguson.' s In
reality, of course, accommodations for blacks were separate, but far from
equal. The institutionalization of segregation and its entrenchment after the
Plessy decision made the task of ending legal segregation extremely
difficult.2 7

Brown was the result of a carefully tailored plan by Houston, Marshall,

and colleagues at the NAACP to attack segregated public professional
graduate schools and colleges and to eventually target the "more sensitive"

area of elementary education." Marshall focused on public education and

gradually knocked down barriers until the Supreme Court could no longer
dodge the issue of "separate but equal" and the doctrine's inherent inequality.
The early cases, which began with Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma," 9 dealt
with forcing the equalization of black facilities rather than eliminating legal
segregation.2t °
Unlike these early triumphs, in Brown, Marshall attacked the "separate

but equal" doctrine as unconstitutional rather than attempt to equalize black
public educational facilities. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
finally overruled Plessy and declared the "separate but equal" doctrine as

inherently unequal. 21' The Court observed:

205. Id. at 490-91.
206. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
207. GOLDMAN & GaLEN, supra note 176, at 42.
208. Id. at 82.
209. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
210. The cases leading up to Brown (and argued by Marshall before the Supreme Court)
were: Sipuel v. University of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (involving the denial of admission to
a state law school solely on grounds of race; the Court held that Oklahoma must provide equal
educational facilities for blacks in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Sweatt v. Painter, 379 U.S. 629 (1950) (stating: University of Texas
Law School denied admission to law school based on racial policy even though Texas did not
have a separate law school for Blacks - the court held that a make-shift school hurriedly set up
for Blacks did not provide equality between the two institutions and that Blacks must be
admitted to the University of Texas Law School); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950) (stating: Equal Protection Clause violated where state, after admitting Blacks
to graduate School, afforded student, solely because of his race, different treatment from other
students by requiring him to sit in "designated colored areas" in class, library, and in the
cafeteria). Although Marshall argued that Plessy and the "separate but equal" doctrine should
be overruled, the Court declined to do so. Instead, the Court chose to bypass that question and
adhere to the principle of deciding "constitutional questions only when necessary to the
disposition of the case at hand." Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631.
211. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn....
Any language in Plessy v. Fergusoncontrary to this finding
is rejected. We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.2" 2
This holding broke down the barriers of segregation in public education and
later, in all other areas where there was legally sanctioned discrimination
based upon race.
C. AFTER BROWN- PUBLIC SERVICE CONTINUES
2 13
After distinguishing himself as one of the "century's legal giants,"
Marshall devoted the balance of his life to public service, remaining true to his
ideals. Those ideals, which focused on helping those in need, permeated
every aspect of Marshall's life and affected his later decisions.
On September 23, 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed Marshall
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit serving New York,
Vermont, and Connecticut." 4 Though the judgeship doubled Marshall's
NAACP salary, the decision to step down as the NAACP's chief legal advisor
was not easy."' Where most attorneys would jump at such a prestigious
position, Marshall's dedication to his cause made the decision difficult.
Marshall felt, however, that he had built 'a damned good staff" 2 16 at the
NAACP and that "it was time to let newer minds take over." 217 Further, he
admitted that "when one has the opportunity to serve his government, he
218
should think twice about passing it up.
Less than four years later, in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson
appointed Marshall to the office of the U.S. Solicitor General. 2"9 The Solicitor
General, the nation's highest ranking lawyer, argues the government's cases

212. Id. at 494-95.
213. Brennan, supra note 178, at 23.
214. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 183, at 12.
215. Id. at 13. In this position, Marshall, once again, excelled. Of the ninety-eight
majority decisions authored by Marshall, none were reversed by the Supreme Court. Id.
216. Id. at 235.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 13.
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before the Supreme Court. The position has been referred to as the "tenth
Supreme Court justice."22 At this point, Marshall faced a personal dilemma
with respect to his financial security. If Marshall gave up his U.S. Appeals
Court judgeship to become U.S. Solicitor General his annual salary would be
reduced from $33,000 to $28,500.2 More importantly, switching jobs would
cause Marshall to relinquish the security of a lifetime federal judgeship to
serve at the inclination of a president whose term was uncertain. Nonetheless,
he accepted the position.222
After serving as U.S. Circuit Judge and Solicitor General, Marshall
became the first African-American to serve on the United States Supreme
Court. In his twenty-four terms on the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall
played a crucial role in enforcing the constitutional protections he fought for
and established before joining the judiciary. In so doing, Marshall created "an
enviable record of opinions supporting the rights of the less powerful and less
fortunate. 223
In Marshall's later years on the high court, he became known as "the
Great Dissenter. ' 224 In those dissents, Marshall reminded lawyers of their
shortcomings as professionals and held true to his strong convictions and his
principles about protecting the poor and the powerless. For example, Marshall
denounced the death penalty precisely because it victimized the poor and
powerless. 22 5 Marshall's opinion in Furmanv. Georgia22 6 is illustrative:
Regarding discrimination, it has been said that '[i]t is
usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the
member of the minority group - the man who, because he
is without means, and is defended by a court-appointed
attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial lamb....'
Racial or other discrimination should not be surprising. In
McGauthav. California,this Court held 'that committing to
the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pro-

220. Id. at 246. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell made this remark because the
Supreme Court must rely heavily on the Solicitor General for the accurate presentation of facts
and legal issues. In addition, the Solicitor General helps the Court decide what cases it will
hear. Id.
221. Id. at 245.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 14.
224. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Marshall, the Great Dissenter, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1991,

at L23.

225.
226.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971).

Id.
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nounce life or death in capital cases is [not] offensive to
anything in the Constitution.' This was an open invitation
to discrimination."
And in Richmond v. Croson Company,228 arguing in favor of affirmative
action, Marshall incisively opined:
Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court has
adopted strict scrutiny as its standard of Equal Protection
Clause review of race-conscious remedial measures. This is
an unwelcome development. A profound difference
separates governmental actions that themselves are racist,
and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of
prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental activity
from perpetuating the effects of such racism.
Racial classification 'drawn on the presumption that one
race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of
government behind racial hatred and separatism' warrant
the strictest judicial scrutiny because of the very irrelevance
of these rationales. By contrast, racial classifications drawn
for the purpose of remedying the effects of discrimination
that itself was race based have a highly pertinent basis: the
tragic and indelible fact that discrimination against black
and other racial minorities in this Nation has pervaded our
I,
Nation's history and continues to scar our society ....
however, do not believe this Nation is anywhere close to
eradicating racial discrimination or its vestiges. In
constitutionalizing its wishful thinking, the majority today
does a grave disservice not only to those victims of past and
present racial discrimination in this Nation whom government has sought to assist, but also to this Court's long
tradition of approaching issues of race with the utmost
sensitivity. 9
Throughout his life, Justice Marshall placed monetary gain second to
public service. His financial status reflected that choice. In 1989 financial
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229.

Id. at 364-65 (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,207 (1970)).
488 U.S. 469.
Id. at 551-53 (internal citations omitted).
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disclosure statements that made public the assets of Supreme Court justices,
Marshall listed his holdings as between $50,000 and $100,000.23 By contrast,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor listed her assets as between $1.3 and $2.6
million, and Justices Harry Blackmun, Anthony Kennedy, William Rehnquist,
John Paul Stevens, Antonio Scalia, and Byron White listed their assets close
to $500,000.23' Also, Marshall declined a $250,000 advance offered to
publish his memoirs because the publisher wanted Marshall to reveal the
secrets of the Court's inner sanctum, which Marshall refused to do.232
At the end of his career, Marshall understandably expressed satisfaction
with the way he lived his life and conducted his career. All lawyers can take
great pride in Marshall the lawyer, and Marshall the public servant. We all
have the opportunity and privilege to similarly contribute to society.
CONCLUSION

Did we become lawyers to become "parasites" on society? Or did we
become lawyers because we felt we could somehow make a difference and/or
serve society? If the former, then we should adjust our attitudes. If the latter,
then can we, in good conscience, allow a majority of our society to be ignorant
of their rights? Can we acknowledge their rights, yet stand by while those
rights go unenforced?
Lawyers are constantly making choices. We are in the position of not
pursuing certain goals in favor of others. In Sartre's words, we choose even
when we seem not to choose. We choose by not choosing. Unfortunately, the
majority of today's lawyers choose to pursue monetary gain at the expense of
public service. Clients and society, however, will be better served if lawyers
choose goals that are defined by a sense of morality, dedication to a cause, or
service to the public.
Lawyers too will be better served. By dedicating some portion of their
practices to causes they believe in, and ideals they are passionate about,
lawyers can emulate Thurgood Marshall's accomplishments and feel better
about their career. Instead of complaining because their work is "meaningless" or "not helping others," lawyers can feel good about at least part of their
work which helps others. Whether helping the elderly defend their homes
against claims by scam artists,'serving as volunteer counsel to battered women
shelters, or helping in any other number of worthy causes, every lawyer can
230. Tony Mauro, Two High Court Justices Top $1 Million Benchmark, USA TODAY,
May 17, 1990, at 2A, available in 1990 WL 7565054.
231. Id.
232. Kenneth R. Walker, Editorial, The Fight Over Marshall's Papers, S. F. CHRON.,
June 3, 1993, at A21, available in 1993 WL 6411588.
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easily find some cause to help provide legal assistance to people in need to
assert or protect their rights. Lawyers would add meaning to their careers, the
debate over mandatory pro bono would become unnecessary, and the public
might feel better about lawyers and what they do.
I could not have written this article without the accomplishments of
Thurgood Marshall. The doors of education that are now open for me and
many others might still be closed if not for the high sense of professionalism
that marked Marshall's career.233 When Marshall died, Paul Gewirtz said of
him: "He fundamentally changed our world for the better, which can be said
of very few lawyers." 2" If lawyers redefine "doing well" to include service

to others and to society, we will be able to say of many lawyers: "They
changed our world for the better."

233. As an African-American attorney, my opportunity to practice law is a direct result
of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), a case Marshall argued before the Supreme Court.
The Sweatt decision, and a companion case, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637 (1950), held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented
states from distinguishing between students of different races in professional and graduate
education in state universities. More precisely, in Sweatt, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment required that Sweatt, an African-American, be admitted to the statemaintained University of Texas Law School open to white students, even though the state
maintained another law school exclusively for African-Americans. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634-36.
This decision, fueled by Marshall's heroic efforts, paved the way for African-Americans to
"claim [their] full constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to
students of other races." Id. at 635.
234. Paul Gewirtz, Thurgood Marshall, 101 YAlE L.J. 13, 18 (1991).

